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The Changing Nature of Labor, Management,
and Government Interactions
Harry C. Katz
.j
,j
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Although it is not clear what explains the enormous economic success of
the United States in the 1990s, no one would claim that national-level dia-
logue, partnership, and forums through which representatives of labor,
management, and the government discuss economic policies played any
role in U.S. success because such activities are infrequent and inconse-
quential in the United States. Based on U.S. experience, one might go on
to conclude that national-level social dialogue and partnership are irrele-
vant to economic performance and policy-:making everywhere. This book
shows that this conclusion is wrong.
In Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, national-level social
dialogue and partnership and other national-level interactions between
representatives of labor, management, and the government, what is
referred to as tripartism, have played a positive role addressing critical
economic and social problems. This book shows that there is a spectrum
of recent experience with tripartism. In some countries, tripartism is
insignificant (the United States), it is on the decline (Japan and Australia),
and its use expanded in the early and mid-1990s and then appeared to
decline (Italy). In a few countries, tripartism is flourishing (Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Germany), and in others it has been used sporadically
and with limited success (Korea).
This book shows that the topics addressed and the participants included
in tripartite arrangements vary between countries. Tripartite activities are
1-
---.
2 The New Structure of Labor Relations
not an invention of the 1990s. In a number of social democratic countries
in the 1960s and 1970s, corporatism involving dialogue between repre-
sentatives of labor, management, and government focused on efforts to
control inflation (incomes policy) and often involved political exchanges
whereby tax and other government policies were traded for wage (and
price) moderation. Ye!, while tripartism has some similarities with earlier
forms of national-level social dialogue, a number of factors distinguish
recent tripartite activities. This book describes how tripartism has
come to focus more on working-time flexibility and the promotion of part-
time work rather than on inflation. Tripattite dialogue also has ex-
panded beyond traditional corporatist partners to include women's
groups, representatives of senior citizens, and other representatives of
"civic society."
.
The nature and role of labor, management, and government interac-
tions are changing in critical ways beyond the replacement of corporatism
with more varied forms of tripartite dialogue and policy-making in coun-
tries where corporatism flourishes. Chapters in this book, tracing devel-
opments in Japan, Korea, Australia, and the United States, find that
although tripartism has not been central to economic policy-making in
recent years in those countries a variety of other "coordinating" mecha-
nisms provide interactions that help shape employment conditions and
labor policy. The fact that there has been so much vibrancy in these coor-
dinating mechanisms goes against the notion, popular in some quarters,
that there is an overpowering unilateral decentralizing shift underway in
labor-management interactions. These coordinating functions are, in fact,
increasing in the face of intensified pressures promoting greater flexibility
in work organization and working time.
At the same time, individualization and other, often related forms
of decentralization in the structure of labor and management interactions
are on the rise nearly everywhere and affect both the processes through
which employment conditions are being determined and employment
outcomes, including pay, working time, and work organization. So,
even within countries, there are complex and somewhat contradictory
shifts underway in the structure of labor, management, and government
interactions.
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Introduction 3
whether countries with particular structures for collective bargaining
perform better than other countries. Calmfors and Driffill (1988), who
claimed that countries with either highly centralized or highly decentral-
ized collective bargaining structures were more successful in terms of
economic performance (low inflation and strong economic growth),
investigated the macroeconomic effects of the structure of collective bar-
gaining. Their research triggered much debate. Soskice (1990), for
example, criticizes as overly simplistic the ordering of collective bargain-
ing systems used in the Calmfors and Driffill analysis, pointing out that
informal forms of coordinated bargaining, such as Shunto bargaining in
Japan, are often important and are not captured well in the measure
of bargaining centralization used by Calmfors and Driffill. I have argued
that recognition of the various components of bargaining structure limits
the value of categorizing national bargaining systems along a single
centralization-decentralization spectrum (Katz 1993).
Soskice (1990) went on to argue that the extent of coordination within
corporate-bank relations and other institutional arrangements produces
a critical differentiation between "coordinated" and "uncoordinated"
market economies. In a related analysis, Traxler (1995a) claims that a
distinction between "organized versus disorganized decentralization" is
necessary to account for the widespread nature of the pressures for
decentralization and better captures the various paths of national devel-
opment. Sisson and Marginson's (2002) account of the various forms of
bargaining coordination within Europe provides recognition of the
increased role that coordinated bargaining plays within and across coun-
tries. Other related analyses appear in what has come to be called the
"varieties of capitalism" research literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). This
literature builds on Soskice's distinction between coordinated and market
economies to examine the depth and implications of the various forms of
corporate and industrial relations structure that appear within advanced
industrial economies.
This book extends the varieties of capitalism debate by providing in-
depth analysis of the changing nature of labor, management, and govern-
ment interactions in a number of key countries. With a common focus,
the chapters that follow examine how the structure of collective bargain-
ing has evolved since the early 1980s.1he evidence shows that in all coun-
tries there was pressure for decentralization and in nearly all countries in
the 1990s there were efforts to create some form of national-level tripar-
tism. Exactly how tripartism connected to the more decentralized bar-
gaining that was simultaneously spreading in those countries is one of the
key issues examined in the country chapters.
'"
4 The New Structure of Labor Relations
THE PLAN OF THE BOOK
This book includes country chapters written by leading researchers about
developments in Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the
Netherlands, and the United States. The country chapters examine the
changing nature of labor, management, and government interactions with
a special focus on tripartite dialogue and labor policy-related forums.
Early drafts of these chapters were presented at a conference cosponsored
by the Korean Labor Institute and the ILR School of Cornell University
in Ithaca, New York, on October 5 and 6, 2001. The policy and research
questions that motivated the conference are. highlighted below.
j
I
1
1
I
I,
i
I
L
The Nature of Tripartite Dialogue and Labor Policy Making
With the limited success that incomes policies had in restraining inflation
in a number of countries in the 1960s and 1970s, one might have expected
that tripartism would have lost its appeal. In this light, the negotiation
of prominent tripartite accords in the 1990s in Ireland, Italy, and the
Netherlands, and the national employment pact in Germany is quite sur-
prising. What are these tripartite accords and pacts about and what has
led to their formation? And, how do these recent pacts compare and
contrast with earlier forms of corporatism?
On the one hand, it appears that recent tripartite pacts have much in
common with the previous corporatist interactions that occurred in
incomes policies. Both give central importance to wage moderation, even
though the specific pressure for such moderation, the need for monetary
discipline in order to conform to European Union and related monetary
union pressures, adds a new twist to recent tripartite activities. On the
other hand, with an emphasis on workplace and employment flexibility,
promotion of participatory processes, and inclusion of social security
reforms, recent tripartite pacts seem to be broader in scope as compared
to earlier corporatist agreements. But is this breadth in recent tripartite
pacts real and, if so, is the breadth really new?
It also is important to examine how the process of tripartism has
changed. For example, are new parties representing the interests of civil
. society and are new modes of interaction between the various involved
parties critical to the operation of recent tripartism? And perhaps most
importantly, is there evidence that recent tripartism is working, in the sense
that it is meeting the parties' or society's objectives? The analyses that
follow shed light on these issues and help identify whether there is one
best way to structure or operate tripartism.
There was much theorizing in previous research about the factors that
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influenced the success of corporatism, including the degree of encom-
passing interest representation, union democracy, and social democratic
political strength (Schmitter 1981, Regini 1997 and 2000, Streeck 1982,
Crouch 1985, Baccaro 2000). Schmitter (1979) argues that mechanisms
that shielded union leaders from popular pressures assisted corporatism
in the 1970s and 1980s. Baccaro (2002), in contrast, claims that it was
the spread of internal democracy in unions that was a key to the. success
of tripartism in Italy in the 1990s. Was union democracy also central to
the success of tripartite activities in other countries in recent years? More
generally, one of the most important contributions of this book is analy-
sis of how the preconditions affecting the success of recent national tri-
partite pacts compare and contrast to those that influenced earlier
corporatism.
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Previous research shows that in nearly all countries in the 1980s and
1990s, the locus of collective bargaining shifted downward, often from a
national or multicompany level to the firm or plant level. This shift
included the breakdown of a national confederation-level agreement in
Sweden,. the erosion of national tribunal pay setting and the spread of
enterprise bargaining in Australia, and the decline of multicompany bar-
gaining in the United Kingdom and the United States. In these and other
countries pay was increasingly being set, partially if not fully, at the plant
or enterprise level. And where multiemployer bargaining persisted, as in
Germany and Italy, its influence declined as sectoral or national agree-
ments in those countries increasingly provided only minimum employment
terms rather than contractual standards as in the past.
In nearly all countries, as shown by previous research, the intensity of
local bargaining, involving local unions, works councils, or work groups
increased dramatically in recent years. Much of this bargaining involved
qualitative issues concerning work organization and work restructuring.
In some cases local bargaining included increased use of contingent pay
methods, as pay in one way or another became linked to plant, firm, indi-
vidual, or some other measure of economic performance. Informal inter-
actions between labor and management took on greater importance as
part of work restructuring, which in some cases amounted to "concession
bargaining" (i.e., highly pressurized efforts to stave off a plant closing or
layoffs). In the process, work rules, working time, and work organization,
often under the rubric of a search for greater workplace flexibility, took
on greater importance.
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.... 6 The New Structure of Labor Relations
The push for the individualization of payor work practices provided
further impetus to the decentralization of collective bargaining. As pay-
for-knowledge, skill premiums, bonuses, and gain-sharing systems spread,
any higher-level pay agreements increasingly served as frameworklike pay
mmlma.
In the United Kingdom and Australia, the replacement of collective
contracts with individual contracts provided an even more extreme form
-
of bargaining structure decentralization. Even more widespread was the
decline in union coverage and strength. In nearly all countries, the percent
of the work force covered by collective contracts declined and nonunion
employment became the ultimate decentralized way to set employment
terms.
There were, of course, some exceptions to these trends. For example,
with a longstanding tradition of heavy reliance on enterprise-level bar-
gaining in the private sector, Japan experienced less downward movement
in the locus of bargaining, at least as suggested by evidence up until the
mid-1990s. Evidence of stability in the locus of wage setting in Japan is
seen in the lack of an upward trend in inter-enterprise variation in Shunto
wage increases as of the mid-1990s (Katz and Darbishire 2000, 232). At
the same time, by the mid-1990s, some signs of increased pay ,variation
did appear within Japanese firms through greater use of ability-based pay
and variation in annual bonuses (Katz and Darbishire 2000, 236). Yet,
previous research has not clarified whether, in the face of pressures result-
ing from sluggish economic growth from the mid-1990s on, Japan has
begun to experience more extreme changes in the structure of labor, man-
agement, and government interactions. Japan is just an illustration of the
questions that exist concerning the scope, nature, and implications of
recent changes in the structure of interactions in other countries.
The Interaction between Decentralized Collective Bargaining
and Tripartism
How has decentralized collective bargaining interacted with tripartite
activities and what is likely to evolve in the future? By the mid-1990s in
Italy, Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands, the emergence (or in some
cases, reemergence) of tripartite agreements led some to claim that the
structure of collective bargaining was being recentralized (Baccaro 2000).
Yet it is possible that plant and local collective bargaining will continue
to spread while national pacts, focusing on wage moderation and work-
place flexibility (and other matters), are forged in these countries. Or tri-
partism might spur various aspects of decentralized collective bargaining
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by promoting the development of local labor-management partnerships or
through payor productivity mandates or targets.
Australia provides an interesting case that might shed light on
future possibilities in other countries. In Australi~, the push for greater
enterprise-level bargaining in the 1980s and early 1990s occurred under
the rubric of an incomes policy provided through a national union-
government agreement, the "accord," which included a number of rounds.
To some extent the accord facilitated union acceptance of the simultaneous
decentralization underway in the structure of collective bargaining as the
Australian labor movement "favored a decentralization of bargaining
toward the enterprise level provided this occurred within a strong cen-
tralized framework (at national and industry levels)" (Bray 1991). The
accord, however, was ended in 1996 by the newly elected conservative
government of John Howard. The extent to which the accord provides
a precursor or future road map for national tripartite agreements in
European countries and elsewhere warrants clarification. More generally,
one of the tasks of the research in the country chapters that follow is
examination of the interaction between decentralization in the structure
of collective bargaining and national-level tripartism.
Another debate that surfaced as collective bargaining decentralization
has proceeded concerns the extent to which this shift is transitory. Decen-
tralization is likely to be transitory if it is essentially a mechanism through
which employers gain bargaining power advantage. The idea here is that
it is the process of decentralization that is most important. Employers in
this view benefit most from the ability to play plants (and local unions)
off against one another, that is, to whipsaw local unions. Yet this might
only be a transitory need as, after gaining lower wage outcomes or wider
skill differentials through whipsawing, employers then might prefer a
return to centralized bargaining because of the advantages it provides (sta-
bility, predictability, and economies of scale).
A way to understand the potential temporary advantages to decentral-
ized collective bargaining is to recognize the possibility that employers
need decentralized bargaining to gain concessions because central unions
are unwilling to grant the concessions employers desire, while local unions
are more willing to do so given that they feel more direct pressure from
workers threatened by employment losses. The question of whether or not
these transitory advantages are critical arises because previous research
has not clarified the reasons why employers' favor bargaining decentral-
ization. Examination of recent developments can also clarify whether the
structure of collective bargaining truly has been recentralized in recent
years and the breadth of any such recentralization.
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8 The New Structure of Labor Relations
Shifts in Bargaining Power
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the impetus for the decentralization of col-
lective bargaining clearly came from management. It was management
that was either directly pushing for decentralization in its bargaining and
public demands, as in Australia, or indirectly promoting decentralization
as the device to provide pay and work rule concessions, as occurred com- .
manly in the United States and even in Germany.
As the labor market improved in the late 1990s, however, in many
countries labors' relative bargaining power improved and this shift
reduced employers' whipsaw leverage. The United States was an extreme
example as the labor market strengthened to the point that a debate
ensued regarding the extent and permanence of "hyper-mobility" and the
associated possibility that highly skilled labor could "call the shots" in the
labor market. The bursting of the dot.com bubble in spring 2000 in
the United States and the subsequent economic downturn, however,
then markedly altered the state of the labor market. As a result, it is a
propitious time to examine the effects that economic conditions exert
on bargaining structure. For, if the intensity of the pressure for the
decentralization of bargaining structure is found to be linked to the state
of the economy, then this would lend credence to the notion that a key
determinant of bargaining structure is bargaining power.
Furthermore, if relatively stronger labor movements are unable to
reverse bargaining decentralization, this may reflect either a shift in labors'
preferences (and if so, it would be interesting to know why labor has come
to prefer decentralized bargaining) or the fact that it is total and not
relative power that drives bargaining structure. Total power concerns
the total profits (i.e., economic rents) that are available for distribution.
There is some previous economic research suggesting that centralized
collective bargaining spreads when total power is high, as in this
circumstance labor and management have reason to join together in
centralized forums to divide up the large available economic rents and
symmetrically, when economic rents shrink, the parties are pushed to
decentralize collective bargaining (Hendricks and Kahn 1982). This can
explain why the push for decentralization strengthened in the 1980s and
early 1990s in the face of globalization and economic deregulation.
Yet it is not clear whether recognition of the role of total power really
helps explain recent events and whether the effects of shifts in the parties'
total power can be disentangled from the effects of shifts in relative bar-
gaining power. One of the tasks of comparative research is to make use,
as best as possible, of variations in labor and management's power over
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Introduction 9
time and across countries to clarify the influence and effects of relative
and total power.
Bargaining power is only one among a number of possible causes of
shifts in the nature and locus of labor, management, and government inter-
actions. I, and others, claim that work reorganization and corporate or
worker interest diversification have been a key pressure for the decentral-
izations occurring in the structure of collective bargaining and corpora-
tions (Katz 1993, Purcell and Ahlstrand 1994). While bargaining power
and diversification matter, a strong role also is being played by work reor-
ganization as unions and workers have become "co-managers of the inter-
nallabor market" (Streeck 1984). Decentralization has been linked to the
elevation in the importance of local bargaining because the process of
identifying efficient (or acceptable) team work systems and the successful
implementation of new work practices apparently requires the active par-
ticipation of local actors and local experimentation with new packages of
employment practices. Analysis of recent trends thus can help clarify the
role played by these and other forces and thereby help identify the causes
and consequences of decentralization in the structure of collective bar-
gaining and its extreme variants, individualization and deunionization.
The chapters that follow go a long way in providing answers to the
many critical questions identified above. Where currently available evi-
dence remains limited, the chapters at least help clarify the key issues that
remain for future research.
~1 The Irish Experiment in
Social Partnership
am
me1
the
cou
Paul Teague and James Donaghey
nar
nat
dOl
ner
eco
ren
me
soc
set
McDonalds, the fast food chain restaurant, has an outlet just off
O'Connell Street, the main thoroughfare in Dublin. In 1987, it advertised
part-time vacancies and within a day a huge queue had formed composed
of different strata of people all sharing the common desire of getting
employment. Fast-forward a decade and the scene is radically different.
Traffic in Dublin's city center is in gridlock, and the new prosperity of the
country can be seen by the huge amount of construction activity and hustle
and bustle of people in the streets. Even if we set aside unhelpful
metaphors such as the Celtic Tiger, it is difficult not to reach the conclu-
sion that the economic (and social) transformation experienced by the
Republic of Ireland in the nineties was nothing less than spectacular.1 The
country has switched from being a basket case to one that enjoys virtual
full employment. A national framework for social partnership has been in
place during the economic upturn period. It would be excessive to argue
that social partnership was the main driver behind the economic revival.
A multitude of factors, positively interacting with each other, fueled the
high growth rates. At the same time, social partnership has made an
important contribution to economic transformation.
This paper assesses the Irish experience of social partnership. We pay
particular attention to what type of coordination was promoted by the
various national social agreements. A number of overlapping arguments
are advanced. One is that social partnership in Ireland is contained within
a multidimensional framework, some parts of which echo traditional "cor-
poratist" practices and procedures while others are more innovative in
character. We suggest that the social partnership framework is not exactly
gal
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a model of coordinated decentralization and is better described as an open
method of labor market coordination. A second argument is that while
the Irish experience of social partnership holds important lessons for other
countries, claims that it represents a new model of labor market gover-
nance should be treated with caution. Irish social partnership is a combi-
nation of old and new employment relations practices customized to suit
domestic economic and political conditions. Third, whether social part-
nership has fully secured its declared purpose of promoting a form of
economic development that combines competitiveness and fairness
remains an open question.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section develops our
meaning of coordinated decentralization and situates its relevance to Irish
social partnership. Then a number of contextual points are developed to
set the scene for our discussion of social partnership. Next the wage bar-
gaining element of Irish social partnership is set out and evaluated. After
this assessment, the discussion turns to the theme of enterprise partner-
ship and shows how this concept has grown in importance in recent years.
The conclusion brings together the various arguments of the paper and
makes some observations about the future of the social partnership
framework.
COORDINATED DECENTRALIZATION AND THE IRISH
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SYSTEM
We pay
by the
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al "cor-
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exactly
A popular argument is that national employment relations systems in
Europe are gravitating in one way or another toward a coordinated decen-
tralization model of employment relations. Coordinated decentralization
is usually interpreted in two different ways in the literature. One fairly
narrow perspective is that it involves the "loosening" of centralized or
sector-level collective bargaining systems. On this view, tightly integrated
extrafirm bargains are no longer sustainable in the face of a variety of eco-
nomic and social transformations that are encouraging greater economic
decentralization. The new competitive environment is no place for tight
institutional constraints. Organizations must be permitted to make
emergency deviations from established industry or national pay rates.
Alternatively the centralized bargaining machinery must only produce
framework agreements that set indicative guidelines (as opposed to
binding rules) for pay increases and improvements in working conditions
(Ferner and Hyman 1998; Traxler 1995a). The second view of coordi-
nated decentralization is more expansive in outlook. It is a story of how
the complementarity and fit between decentralized institutions can
'#~-
." The New Structure of Labor Relations12
produce highly coordinated labor markets. On this account, coordinated
decentralization gives rise to systems of national institutional comparative
advantage, leading to high grade, yet distinctive forms, of economic per-
formance (Soskice 1999).
The evolving system of Irish social partnership approximates neither
perspective on coordinated decentralization. On the one hand, it amounts
to more than defensive adaptations to employment relations institutions
to counter the dissolving effects of globalization, technological innovation,
and social change. On the other hand, Ireland does not possess tightly
integrated, complementary labor market institutions, which have given
rise to a specialized institutional pattern of comparative economic advan-
tage. In the Irish context, achieving close institutional fit between differ-
ent parts of the employment relations system is neither seen as possible
nor particularly desirable. Addressing market (and institutional) failures,
the main motivation for seeking coordination in the first place, is still
considered important, but it is done by what we call the open method of
coordination.
The open method of coordination as developed in Ireland has five prop-
erties. First, the governance of wage determination remains the core func-
tion of the social partnership arrangement. This is the social glue that
holds together the entire system. On carrying out this function, Irish social
partnership embodies the same tensions and dilemmas associated with
more established" corporatist" methods of wage setting. A second and
more distinctive attribute of Irish social partnership has been the empha-
sis placed on producing a procedural consensus, as opposed to building
complementarities, between employment relations actors to guide the
search for solutions to identified problems. Complementarities between
labor market institutions smack too much of seeking a "static equilib-
rium" within a social partnership arrangement, causing them to be too
fixed and rigid in what they do. A procedural consensus, on the other
hand, assumes a greater capacity on the part of institutions to change over
time so that they are more able to keep pace with fast-changing business
and labor market conditions.
The third feature of open coordination is that decision-making inside
the social partnership framework does not solely involve tough bargain-
ing to reach an accommodation between competing employment relations
interests, but also" deliberative" type interactions that rely more on evi-
dence-based and reasonable discussions to advance policy ideas. In old-
fashioned employment relations language, social partnership should be as
much about integrative bargaining as distributional bargaining (Walton
and McKersie 1965). The motive behind this development is to challenge
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llated
ratlve
adversarial attitudes and behavior that have been longstanding features of
Irish employment relations and encourage cooperative forms of manage-
ment and employee interactions. Thus much is made of terms such as
shared understandings and joint action in social partnership circles.
Fourth and notwithstanding the early observation about the centrality
of the wage bargain, open coordination has sought to widen the scope of
social partnership agreements so that they include public policies designed
to promote social inclusion. In concrete institutional terms, this has
lead to "new" social groups, such as those representing the unemployed,
gaining entry into the negotiating process to conclude social partnership
deals. Fifth, open coordination places less emphasis on traditional
methods of labor market regulation that use constraining rules to tie
employers to particular employment practices. More prominence is given
to designing "enabling" or supportive public programs that would
advance the competitive performance of organizations while ensuring that
employees enjoy decent working conditions.
This open method of coordination that guides Irish social partnership
raises a wide range of fascinating questions. For example, can civil asso-
ciations be integrated into a social partnership arrangement in a manner
that confers on them the same "public status" enjoyed by employers groups
and trade unions? What types of social inclusion programs have been pro-
duced by the social partnership agreements and how do they relate to the
pay deals? We do not have the space to address properly these questions
despite their obvious importance. Our focus is primarily on the evolution
of managerial-employee interactions under social partnership. In address-
ing this matter we will be concerned with traditional employment relations
issues-how have the social partnership agreements affected labor market
outcomes, what has been the fate of the unions, and so on. At the same
time, we try to shed light on the importance of some of the proclaimed
innovative aspects to social partnership in Ireland. In particular we assess
whether social partnership is promoting new credible commitments
between Irish employers and trade unions and whether the social partner-
ship agreements have balanced equity and efficiency in labor markets. But
before we get on to these topics a number of preliminary remarks are
required to explain the dynamics of Irish employment relations.
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MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYMENT INTERACTIONS IN IRELAND:
SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Adversarialism and voluntarism are well-established features of Irish
employment systems. To a large extent, this is an administrative legacy of
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British rule in Ireland. The organization and behavior of employers and
trade unions had a strong "British" voluntarist feel to them. With regard
to organized labor, its most pronounced feature was its fragmented struc-
ture. Every occupational segment, no matter how small, seemed to have
its own trade union organization. Moreover, in many cases, trade unions
competed for similar type workers. A second feature of trade union orga-
nization was its decentralized orientation. On the one hand, the author-
ity of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the federal body for
organized labor, was carefully circumscribed so that is main role was one
of coordination. On the other hand, local shop stewards enjoyed consid-
erable autonomy, thereby ensuring that they were frequently the pace
setters on employment relations matters. Employer organizations dis-
played many of the fragmented organizational characteristics of trade
unions. In addition, national employer organizations were relatively weak
bodies with little capacity to drive an employment relations agenda from
the center. Both employers and trade unions had a predilection for decen-
tralized employment relations relatively free from legal and government
interference. Both sides preferred to take their chance in a free collective
bargaining tussle rather than allow the government to regulate employ-
ment relations through legal procedures and rules.
Before the current social partnership regime, which started in 1987, the
Irish system of collective bargaining system lacked order. The institutional
level of collective bargaining differed across the economy. In the public
sector, bargaining was centralized: wage rates and most terms of employ-
ment were set by national negotiations. Some local bargaining did take
place, but this was usually limited to matters such as working conditions,
the availability of overtime, or changing job rules. In some spheres of the
market economy, most notably in the construction industry, sector-level
bargaining prevailed. Again, a certain amount of supplementary enterprise
bargaining took place. Overall, decentralized, enterprise-level bargaining
was the norm in the private sector. Various efforts were made to bring
order to this fragmented bargaining system by promoting centralized
incomes policies, especially in the 1970s, but without much success
(Hardiman 1988).
Unlike some "continental" European countries, Ireland has no legal
extension rule that ensures that all "relevant" workers are covered by a
collective agreement. No reliable data exist on collective bargaining cov-
erage, but the consensus view is that sector-level agreements led to more
spreading of bargained terms as compared to other contract forms. Where
enterprise bargaining was the norm, the picture appears patchy: a going-
rate of sorts emerged in some industries, but was absent from other indus-
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The Irish Experiment in Social Partnership 15
tries. A minimum wage was only introduced in 2000. Before then, low-
paid workers received a certain level of protection from two wage-fixing
mechanisms, the Joint Labour Councils (JLCs) and the Joint Industrial
Councils (JICs). These two bodies established a floor for pay and working
conditions in certain low-wage sectors. Since the early 1980s a notable
trend has been the steady growth of a nonunion sector. An important
driver behind this development has been the arrival of new multinational
companies in the country, particularly those based in the United
States. All in all, before the mid-1980s Irish employment relations were
voluntarist in character and the structure of collective bargaining was
fragmented.
Another important contextual point to note is the extreme openness
of the Irish economy. In Ireland's formative years, Irish governments
sought national self-sufficiency through a strong program of protectionism
(Mj0set 1992; Lee 1989). This policy was a wholesale failure. In the fifties,
the political and administrative elite engineered a complete policy rever-
sal and introduced a regime of unfettered economic openness. Generous
tax incentives were created to attract foreign direct investment and many
multinationals, particularly those based in the United States, took up the
offer. The result is that foreign companies now dominate the tradable
sector in the country. Economic openness was advanced by Irish entry into
the European Union (EU) in 1973. Deeper economic integration with the
rest of Europe exposed many parts of Irish indigenous industry for the
first time to international competition. The process of economic openness
has continuously increased ever since. As a result, Ireland is probably the
most-exposed EU economy.
. This has led to two powerful dynamics, one of constrained discretion
and the other of guiding economic policy-making. Placing such an empha-
sis on attracting foreign companies to advance industrial development has
encouraged governments to act in a self-restraining manner. For example,
an unwritten assumption is that the labor market cannot be regulated too
much as it might discourage multinationals from moving to the country.
At the same time, public policy has been designed to maximize the posi-
tive spillover effects that can be derived from foreign direct investment. A
case in point is the range of programs developed to build "backward link-
ages" between foreign and domestically owned companies. This policy
mix of constrained discretion and guiding has left an imprint on Irish
employment relations. On the one hand, the adversarial orientation of
the "British" model of industrial relations sits uneasily with efforts to
project Ireland as a warm home for multinationals. On the other hand,
the disorganized character of the employment relations system may hold
16 The New Structure of Labor Relations
back the capacity of organizations to "appropriate" new ways of doing
things.
THE SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP EXPERIMENT
While the preceding contextual remarks provide the necessary background
to discussing the evolution of social partnership, it is importan~ to stress
the contingent nature of the birth of this arrangement. Social partnership
owes a great deal to the election of a Fianna Fail minority government in
1987. The political hue of this political party is right-of-center. Neverthe-
less, it was strongly committed to tackling the dire economic and social
situation prevailing in the country through a program of social consensus
(Manseragh 1986: Fianna Fail 1987). A national pay deal was seen as the
centerpiece of this economic strategy. A national consensus quickly formed
with a bipartisan approach being followed by the two largest parties,
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael (also a center right party and the largest oppo-
sition party) in the area of economic policy. Both trade unions and
employers were supportive of this move toward a centralized wage agree-
ment. For the trade union movement, national pay determination was a
way of avoiding a Thatcherlike offensive, which was causing big damage
to organized labor in the United Kingdom. For employers, centralized bar-
gaining held out the promise of stable employment relations. Moreover,
they did not want to be seen standing apart from a "national effort" to
pull the country back from the economic abyss (MacSharry and White
2000). In addition to dealing with the country's domestic economic diffi-
culties, the social partners and political parties were of the view that a
consensus-based employment relations system would better place the
country to become a member of a European monetary union (Teague
1995; MacSharry and White 2000). Thus a variety of pressing internal
and external economic pressures pushed employment relations actors
toward national wage setting.
Altogether there have been five separate national agreements. The
process got under way in October 1987 with the Programme for National
Recovery (PNR). The PNR was followed by further agreements in 1990
(Programme for Economic and Social Progress, PESP), 1993 (Programme
for Competitiveness and Work, PCW), 1996 (Partnership 2000), and 2000
(Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, PPF) (Government of Ireland
1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000).
The first three agreements more or less replicated centralized wage
agreements as practiced elsewhere. The key representatives of employers
and trade unions-the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Federated
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The Irish Experiment in Social Partnership 17
Union of Employers, the Construction Industry Federation, the Confed-
eration of Irish Industry-and four agricultural organizations (three for
the PNR in 1987) negotiated the terms of these agreements. By 1994, all
of the five parliamentary parties in the Dail (Irish parliament) had been
involved in governments that oversaw social partnership agreements. This
covered a broad ideological spectrum involving the left-wing Democratic
Left; the center left Labour party; the center right parties, Fianna Fail and
Fine Gael; and the right-wing Progressive Democrats.
After the negotiation of the PCW in 1993, the institutional complex-
ion of social partnership changed. In particular, a fourth community
pillar was introduced into the social partnership framework. The bodies
included the National Women's Council of Ireland, the Irish National
Organization for the Unemployed (INOU), and the Council of Religions
in Ireland (CORI). CORI and the INOU are highly vocal on the issue of
social exclusion. Nominally these groups participated with full social
partner status in the negotiations that produced in 1996 the fourth social
agreement, Partnership 2000. But the trade unions, employers, and gov-
ernment negotiated the core element of the agreement, the pay deal, alone.
The civil associations had greatest influence on the "social wage" com-
ponent of the national agreement. Like other "corporatist" wage deals in
Europe, the Irish government makes a number of commitments on public
expenditure and taxation to facilitate the pay deals concluded by the
employers and ~nions. In the literature, these commitments are referred
to as corporatist quid pro quo. A feature of these commitments is that
the design, implementation, and evaluation of the public expenditure
commitments usually remain "in-house" concerns of the relevant govern-
ment departments.
Bringing civil associations into the social partnership framework
opened up this relatively closed form of public policy-making. A new
deliberative form of policy-making was introduced, allowing civic associ-'
ations a more active role in the decision-making cycle (NESF 1997). The
hope was that these associations would improve the quality of public pro-
grams through their possession of greater knowledge of the various
dimensions of a particular social problem (O'Donnell and Thomas 1998).
Unfortunately, no convincing research has been completed that assesses
whether this initial expectation has actually been realized.
WAGE BARGAINING AND IRISH SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
Since 1987, wage bargaining has been the mainstay of the various social
partnership agreements. Table 1.1 describes the basic terms of the wage
1988 2.5%
1989 2.5%
1990 2.5%
1991 4.0%
1992 3.0%
1993 3.75%
1994 2.0%*
TABLE 1.1. BASIC PAY TERMS OF NATIONAL PAY AGREEMENTS
Year Other pay and tax featuresBasic pay
mcreases
I: PROGRAMME FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY, 1988-90 INCLUSIVE
Special pay awards for public servants delayed.
Tax cuts of £225 million agreed over three years.
Low-paid workers given "special consideration".
1995
1996
II: PROGRAMME FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, 1991-93
Special rates for the low paid: year 1; 4.25 in year
2; and 5.25 in year 3 for the low paid.
Local bargaining of 3 % permitted in "exceptional
cases".
£400 Million in tax cuts promised.
III: PROGRAMME FOR COMPETITIVENESS AND WORK, 1994-96/7
Public service pay deal: 3.5 years: 5 month pause;
2% in year 1; 2% for year two; 1.5% for next
four months; 1.5% for next three months; 1%
for final 6 months.
Tax cuts focusing on low and middle earners.
Special consideration for the low paid after year 2.
2.5%~'
2.5% for
first six
months *
1% for next
six months *
1997
1998
1999
2.5%
2.25%
1.5% for 9
months,
1.0% for 6
months
IV: PARTNERSHIP 2000, 1997-2000
Public service pay deal: Phase 1: 2.5% of first
£220 basic for nine months, then 2.5% of the
balance of full basic pay for 3 months. After first
year, as private sector.
Provision for local negotiation of further 2 % rise
in years 2 (private sector) and 3 (public sector).
£1 billion on full year cost basis to be made
available for tax relief.
2000
2001
2002
V: PROGRAMME FOR PROSPERITY AND FAIRNESS 2000-2002
Further tax cuts.
Public service pay issue to be resolved by
benchmarking body: 4 % to be allowed for
substantial change in public sector organization.
National minimum wage established to have
reached £5 per hour by the end of the PPF.
5.5%
5.5%
4% for the
next nine
months
*
Private sector excluding construction.
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The Irish Experiment in Social Partnership 19
settlement contained in each agreement. It shows that all five agreements
have contained relatively low increases to nominal wages in Ireland. A
feature of all the wage deals has been the link between the pay awards
and projected economic growth rates. In addition to these basic terms,
three of the agreements-the PESP, Partnership 2000 and the PPF-
included local bargaining clauses. Under these local bargaining clauses
wages were capped: a ceiling was placed on what pay increases an
employer could give at the enterprise level over and above the pay award
set out in the national agreement.
Figure 1.1 suggests that some wage drift, particularly with regard to
the manufacturing sector, occurred during the life span of the various
agreements, but it never got out of control. Since 1990, the correlation
between the pay increases recommended in the agreements and actual
manufacturing wage increases are relatively close. The greatest degree of
drift occurred in 1996 (the final year of the peW) and 1999 (the final year
of Partnership 2000). These figures, however, should be read with caution,
as official Irish wage statistics are not always accurate. Moreover, a certain
level of deviation from negotiated rates was only to be expected in the
context of super economic growth and a tight labor market. But the con-
sensus is that social partnership did deliver wage moderation.
The various pay agreements have delivered real product wage moder-
ation. Figures from European Economy (2001) show that for most of the
1990s productivity increases outstripped wage increases, causing unit
labor costs to fall. This is supporting evidence for those who claim that
the social partnership agreements helped produce a super-competitive
economy in Ireland. Falling unit labor costs amounts to a real deprecia-
tion of the Irish wage system vis.,a-vis other economies" particularly those
of the EU, thus allowing the country to steal a march on their rivals. At
the same time, real wages have increased for Irish workers. Although
workers in some industries have fared better than others during the life-
time of the partnerships, nearly all types of workers have experienced sub-
stantial improvements in their living standards. All in all, under social
partnership wages have been increasing above inflation, allowing real
take-home-pay to improve, but at the same time have not been keeping
pace with productivity improvements, thereby contributing positively to
economic competitiveness.
A debate has flared in recent years about the distributional effects of
the pay agreements. There are two overlapping parts to this argument.
One is that while the share of profits in gross domestic product (GDP) has
increased significantly, the wage share has fallen. Figure 1.2 shows that
that since the start of 1987 the general trend has been for the share of
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i 22 The New Structure of Labor Relations
wages in national income to decline across Europe. But the fall appears
to have been sharper in Ireland than elsewhere, particularly since the mid-
1990s. Even the United Kingdom, one of the homes of neoliberalism, has
not experienced such a marked shift from wages to profits. These figures
should be treated with caution. Ireland has a low rate of corporation tax
for multinationals-the lowest in the EU. Some foreign companies with
operations in the country tend to register profits in Ireland but shortly
afterward repatriate them to the "home" country. Transfer pricing poli-
cies of this kind inflate GDP figures and thus distort the proportion of
wages (and profits) in this set of national account calculations. Neverthe-
less, even allowing for these shadowy accounting practices, the trend
tarnishes the claim that the social partnership regime is producing an
equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth. Workers have
experienced real improvements in living standards during the lifetime of
the present agreements, but employers appear to have fared better. This
should be a cause for concern.
The second part of the argument is that wage inequality has increased
under social partnership. It is widely accepted that income inequality
increased during the 1990s, but this is also true for wage inequality (Barret
et al. 1999; Cantillon et al. 2001). A popular argument normally made
about "corporatist" wage bargaining systems is that they insert both a
floor and ceiling into pay structures, thereby compressing wage differen-
tials. The Irish national pay deals appear not to have produced such sol-
idaristic wage outcomes. This trend has been used to support the argument
that social partnership as practiced in Ireland is essentially neoliberal in
character (Allen 2000). This argument is an overstatement. The Irish labor
market has not followed an "Americanized" path characterized by impres-
sive job generation performance alongside stagnant real wage growth for
many low-income workers. As mentioned above, most workers have expe-
rienced an appreciable increase in wages in Ireland: there has been a rising
tide of economic prosperity.
Nevertheless, rising wage inequality is a troublesome development, but
whether it is regarded as one in policy circles is a moot point. This obser-
vation is an important point for it touches on a critical debate on the eco-
nomic and social content of "Third Way" European social democracy.
Supporters of this approach are coy on the matter of wage inequality, but
there is a suspicion that they regard it as acceptable for some workers to
receive higher wages than others, provided that everybody is progressing
up the wage curve. Increased wage differentials between employees are
interpreted as a sign of the new diversity in occupational structures
brought about by the growth of service industries and an indication that
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The Irish Experiment in Social Partnership 23
meritocracy and effort are being rewarded in the economy. Not everybody
is happy with this approach: social democrats of a more traditional ori-
entation suggest that to accept increases in wage inequality is to abandon
commitments to social justice. This debate is likely to continue for some
time in Ireland and indeed in other EU countries. Our assessment of this
debate in the Irish context is that the increase in wage inequality is a matter
of concern as it threatens the survival of the entire social partnership
framework.
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE
At the start of the present round of social partnership, the Irish economy
faced two major problems: high public debt and high unemployment. In
1987, public debt stood at 118.2 percent of nominal GDP and unem-
ployment was at 16.8 percent. Ireland's economic mess began in the 1970s
with traditional Keynesian expansionary policies being pursued. Of the
two problems identified, the poor fiscal state of the country was seen as
the priority for remedial action. Over a fifteen-year period, due first to an
austere stabilization program and then a prolonged period of revenue
enhancing economic growth, Ireland has reduced significantly its public-
sector debt. In fact, Ireland was able to enter the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1998 with a fiscal performance superior to any of the
other participating countries with the exception of Luxembourg.
When social partnership was initiated in 1987, unemployment stood at
16.8 percent. In addition, emigration was running at a frighteningly high
level as people left the country to secure a better life elsewhere. This sit-
uation has been dramatically turned around. In 2002, unemployment
stood at 4.2 percent, half the EU average. Moreover, to relieve labor
market shortages, Ireland has started "importing" labor to the extent that
immigration now exceeds emigration. Behind this big fall in joblessness
has been a hugely impressive employment-generation machine. To the
extent there has been a miracle of any description in the country it has
been on the employment front. As figure 1.3 shows, since 1987 Ireland
has been one of the EU's star performers in terms of job creation. Market-
or business-related services have been the main source of the new jobs.
Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000) argue that a motivation behind many
of the recent social pacts in Europe has been to bring about welfare state
reform. Countries like Germany and Italy are seen as financially over-
committed in terms of pension provision and other social benefits. As a
result, social partnership agreements are being used to reduce the fiscal
demands made by these social protection systems. But this has not been
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The Irish Experiment in Social Partnership 25
an issue in the Irish context, as the country never really developed a
Swedish or German type welfare system. Rather, a feature of successive
national agreements has been a trade-off between wage moderation and
tax reductions. The focus on tax cuts has been designed to improve the
take-home pay of workers. In 1987, the lower tax rate was 35 percent
whereas those in the upper tax bracket paid 48 percent. In 2001 these
figures had dropped to 20 percent and 42 percent respectively. The plan
is that by the end of 2002 those earning the national minimum wage are
likely to have been taken out of the tax net completely. One argument
gaining ground is that too much emphasis has been placed on tax reduc-
tions and in the future social and health provisions need expansion by
increasing public expenditure.
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS UNDER SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
The Fate of the Trade Unions
As outlined above, the Irish trade union movement has traditionally been
highly fragmented. However, since 1980, mainly as a result of mergers,
the trade union movement in the Republic of Ireland has undergone large-
scale reorganization. Between 1981 and 1999, the number of trade unions
fell from eighty-six to forty-six. A merger in 1989 created Ireland's biggest
union, called SIPTU. In 1999 this union had a total membership of
226,659, which amounted to just over 45 percent of the membership of
trade unions that hold negotiating licenses. The top three unions, SIPTU,
IMPACT, and MANDATE, have 59 percent of total trade union mem-
bership while the ten largest unions make up 86.4 percent of total union
membership. The absolute numbers of those in employment and belong-
ing to a trade union have increased over the past few decades. Yet when
we turn to trade union density levels, the figures are less comforting for
organized labor. Since the mid-1980s, Irish trade union density levels have
been declining, from a high of nearly 48 percent in 1983 to just over 35
percent in 1999. If the period of social partnership is specifically exam-
ined, trade union density has fallen from 43.8 percent to 35.0 percent.
Although social partnership cannot be said to have been disadvanta-
geous to organized labor, it clearly has not been as supportive as some
would have wished. Two different views exist about the cause of the
decline in trade union density. One view is that the decline is due to
employer union avoidance and substitution strategies (Gunnigle 2000;
Gunnigle, O'Sullivan, and Kinsella 2001). The other view is that trade
union membership has simply not been able to keep pace with the quite
spectacular increases in employment. While both factors have been at play,
